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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in attorney malpractice insurance coverage1 have in-
creased the significance of deciding between limited 2 and unlimited 3
liability when selecting a business entity form.4 Unlike partnerships,5
1. Statistics from Attorneys Liability Assurance Society (ALAS), a mutual profes-
sional liability insurance company, show that despite a decrease in the frequency of
legal malpractice claims, there has been an increase in the size of malpractice awards.
In 1987, ALAS reported that there were no malpractice claims valued over $10 million
and that 90% of the claims were valued under $2 million. However, by 1992, "48% of
its claims were valued in excess of $2 million and 12% were greater than $10 million."
Rita H. Jensen, Malpractice Rates May Level Off, NAT'L LJ., July 19, 1993, at 1, 28. The
increase in malpractice awards has been attributed, in part, to the collapse of the sav-
ings and loan industry. See generally Emily Couric, Malpractice: The Tangled Web, A.B.A.J.,
April 1993, at 65 (describing the legal malpractice field as having "gone from a cottage
industry to a full-blown revolution").
Malpractice insurance rates have also been rising. ALAS raised rates by 20% begin-
ning Apr. 1, 1993, for a total increase of 72% since 1991. Minet, Inc., another malprac-
tice insurer, raised professional liability insurance rates by 10% to 20% on October 1,
1993, while St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company raised malpractice insurance
rates by 7% on January 1, 1993. Rita H. Jensen, Malpractice Rates Rise Again, NAT'L LJ.,
Apr. 12, 1993, at 3, 24.
Another trend is for attorneys to go "bare," that is, without malpractice insurance.
Barbara Mahan, Uninsured and Insecure, CAL. LAw., June 1987, at 58, 60. Law firms are
finding that the cost to insure against legal malpractice is not justified by the degree of
exposure. One law firm's premium per attorney jumped $4,300 in one year; conse-
quenly, that firm did not renew its malpractice insurance. Id.
2. Limited liability refers to an individual being held jointly and severally liable for
the tortious and contractual misconduct of the entity's other members, but only up to a
predetermined sum, usually the individual's investment in the business. Larry E. Rib-
stein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REv. 80, 81 n.1 (1991).
This limited liability is typically found in corporate entities. See infra notes 62-78 and
accompanying text.
3. Unlimited liability refers to an individual being held jointly and severally liable
for the full extent of tortious and contractual misconduct of the entity's other mem-
bers. This unlimited liability is typically found in partnership entities. See, e.g., UNIt.
PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 12-15 (1914); See also infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
4. See generally David Paas, Professional Corporations and Attorney-Shareholders: The De-
cline of Limited Liability, 11 J. CORP. L. 371 (1986) (discussing an attorney-shareholder's
choice of forming a PC).
5. Most professionals practice as general partnerships. In 1990 there were 22,386
legal partnerships with 129,996 partners; 7,754 architectural and engineering partner-
ships with 22,726 partners; and 6,891 certified public accountancy partnerships with
36,973 partners. 12 STAT. INCOME BuLL. 8, 57 (1992). In a general partnership, mem-
bers receive partnership tax benefits. Id. at 8. In addition, members are liable for their
own tortious and contractual misconduct. HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WIuiLAi A. GR.EG-
ORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 194 (1979). Each partner
also is jointly and severally liable for the tortious and contractual misconduct of the
other partners, provided the partner's misconduct carries on "in the usual way the busi-
ness of the partnership of which he is a member . . . ." UNIV. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9
(1914). Certain state partnership provisions do not distinguish between joint and sev-
eral liability for tortious misconduct and joint liability for contractual causes of action.
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 48-2-11 (1991) (stating rule to be that all partners
[Vol. 20
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professional corporations (PC),6 limited liability companies (LLC),7
and, in a number of states, registered limited liability partnerships8
have statutory provisions purporting to limit a professional's vicarious
liability for the contractual and tortious misconduct of the entity's
other members.9 However, some state supreme courts have denied
limited liability to attorneys practicing within PCs, thus bringing into
question the viability of legislatively-created liability shields.1O
The denial of PC limited liability raises the question of whether simi-
lar LLC liability shield provisions will effectively protect an attorney-
member or an attorney-manager11 from vicarious liability for the mis-
conduct of the firm's other attorney-members or attorney-managers.
The PC and the LLC are business entity forms available to attorneys
in Minnesota12 and the enabling statutes for both entities contain legis-
are jointly liable for all partnership debts and obligations). See generally W. PAGE KEE-
TON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 322 (5th ed. 1984)
(discussing the distinction between joint and several liability and joint liability) [herein-
after KEETON ET AL.].
6. A professional corporation is a corporation organized by persons rendering
services to the public of a type that requires a license or legal authorization. These
services could not be performed by a corporation prior to statutory authorization.
BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARv 309 (5th ed. 1979). See infra Part III. A.
7. See infra part III. B.
8. See infra note 61.
9. An individual may generally be held liable for another's tortious or contractual
misconduct under the theory of vicarious liability. The theory states that:
[B]y reason of some relation existing between A and B, the negligence of A
[towards C] is to be charged against B, although B has played no part in it, has
done nothing whatever to aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all that he
possibly can to prevent it.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 69, at 499. Thus, B may be held vicariously liable to C
because of A's negligence. Id.
10. See infra note 71.
11. A limited liability company member is "a person... [who is] the owner of some
governance rights of a membership interest of the limited liability company." MINN.
STAT. § 322B.03, subd. 30 (1992). A limited liability company manager is "a person
elected, appointed, or otherwise designated as a manager by the board of governors,
and any other person considered elected as a manager pursuant to section 322B.68."
MINN. STAT. § 322B.03, subd. 29 (1992). Consequently, an LLC manager may also be a
member. In a Minnesota attorney professional LLC (PLC), only those members and
managers who are licensed Minnesota attorneys may render legal services on behalf of
the PLC. MINN. STAT. § 319A.09 (1992).
This Comment only addresses issues concerning vicarious liability arising as a result
of the misconduct of other attorneys within the entity of choice. However, the author
recognizes that vicarious liability, if allowed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, may arise
out of acts committed by nonattorney employees of the entity. See, e.g., MIN. STAT.
§ 319A.10 (1992) (allowing liability shield against contractual liability for any contract
executed on behalf of the corporation and within the limits of the executor's actual
authority).
12. See MINN. STAT. §§ 319A.01-.22 (1992) (enabling legislation for professional
corporation); MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.01-.955 (1992) (enabling legislation for limited lia-
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latively created vicarious liability shields.13 However, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has held the regulation of the practice of law to be the
province of the judicial branch.14 The court has been willing to invoke
the inherent powers doctrine to invalidate legislative efforts to regulate
the legal profession. 15
The extent of a Minnesota attorney's liability under either a PC or
LLC has yet to be tested. Thus, one must hypothesize as to whether
the Minnesota Supreme Court will challenge these entities' respective
liability shields. Because the supreme court has shown a willingness to
apply the inherent powers doctrine to limit the legislature's power over
the legal profession, the viability of statutory provisions that potentially
limit the remedies available to a client harmed by an attorney's miscon-
duct merits serious consideration.
This Comment first explores the history of limited liability as it per-
tains to law firms,16 and then describes the liability shields of PC and
LLC entities in other states,1 7 as well as in Minnesota.18 Next, this
Comment discusses the inherent powers doctrine and various judicial
applications of the doctrine to legislative efforts to regulate the legal
profession.' 9 Finally, this Comment analyzes whether the Minnesota
Supreme Court is likely to invoke the inherent powers doctrine to in-
validate the Minnesota PC and LLC liability shields available to
attorneys. 2 0
II. HisTORY
A. The Development of Limited Liability and the Law Firm Before 1960
Prior to the early 1960s, professionals, including attorneys, were not
permitted to form business entities that offered limited liability protec-
bility company). MINN. STAT. § 319A.03 (1992) provides that professionals may form a
PLC, subject to the purpose requirements of the PC statute. Id.
13. MINN. STAT. § 319A.10 (1992) (limiting PC member's tortious and contractual
liability); MINN. STAT. § 322B.303 subd. 1 (1992) (limiting liability of LLC and PLC
member for company obligations).
14. See, e.g., In re Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 199-200, 12
N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943); In reTracy, 197 Minn. 35, 46, 265 N.W. 88, 93, modified by 197
Minn. 35, 267 N.W. 42 (1936).
15. See, e.g., Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 647, 290 N.W. 795, 797 (1940) (disal-
lowing a statutory exemption allowing brokers to charge fees for drafting legal docu-
ments); In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 44-46, 266 N.W. 88, 92-93 (1936) (invalidating a
legislative disbarment proceeding), modified by 197 Minn. 35, 267 N.W. 142 (1936).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra Part VI.
(Vol. 20
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tion.21 Single attorney law firms were limited to the formation of sole
proprietorships. 22 Although sole proprietorships were easy to form,
they posed a significant disadvantage in that the entity and the proprie-
tor shared a single legal identity.23 This subjected the proprietor to
unlimited personal liability for the ordinary debts and obligations of
the proprietorship.
2 4
Two or more attorneys wishing to form a business entity were con-
fined to choosing between general or limited partnerships. 25 Partner-
ships, like sole proprietorships, subjected at least one member to
unlimited liability.2 6 In a general partnership, all partners were held
personally liable for business debts and obligations unless the partners
contractually limited their liability.27 If the business assets were inade-
quate to compensate the firm's creditors or dissatisfied clients, the per-
sonal assets of each partner could be used to satisfy the partnership's
obligations.28 A limited partnership 29 provided a greater liability
shield for limited partners by limiting personal liability to the extent of
their contribution to the partnership.3 0
Unfavorable liability treatment was not the only disadvantage of
forming sole proprietorships and partnerships. Another significant dis-
advantage was that these entities did not provide for the favorable tax
treatment of pension and profit-sharing plans that was provided to in-
21. Stephen E. Kalish, Lawyer Liability and Incorporation of the Law Firm: A Compromise
Model Providing Lawyer-Owners With Limiting Liability and Imposing Broad Vicarious Liability
on Some Layer-Employees, 29 ARiz. L. REv. 563, 563 (1987).
22. Id.
23. WILLIAM CALLISON, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACarrcE: GENERAL AND LIMrED
PARTNERSHIPS § 2.01 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
24. Id.
25. However, an American Bar Association informal ethics opinion determined
that a lawyer may not ethically practice in a law firm as a limited partner under the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity Informal Op. 865 (1965).
26. CALLISON, supra note 23, at §§ 2.02-2.04. A general partnership subjects all
partners to joint and several liability. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 15 (1914). A limited
partner generally has no liability for partnership obligations so long as the limited part-
ner does not become a general partner or does not take part in controlling the limited
partnership business beyond exercising a limited partner's rights and powers. UNIF.
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 303 (1976).
27. CALUJSON, supra note 23, § 2.03, at 2-5.
28. Id.
29. A limited partnership is composed of one or more general partners and one or
more limited partners. UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 101(7) (1976).
30. CALLISON, supra note 23, § 2.04, at 2-8. However, general partners in a limited
partnership are liable for all partnership obligations as if the partnership were a general
partnership. UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 403(b) (1976). Thus, general partners
have joint and several liability for partnership obligations. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr
§ 15 (1914).
1994l
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corporated businesses.31 This unequal tax treatment became a moti-
vating factor for the creation of the professional corporation.3 2
B. The Development of Limited Liability and the Law Firm After 1960
The professional community's insistence on the development of a
business entity that would provide favorable corporate tax treatment
met resistance because of public policy concerns regarding limited lia-
bility provisions in the proposed statutes.33 Courts and legislatures
sought to prohibit the formation of professional corporation law firms
arguing that: (1) the lawyer-client relationship is a personal one, and a
corporation cannot have personal attributes; (2) in a corporate struc-
ture, the lawyer's first duty is to the employer, not the client; (3) an
intermediary should not be permitted to intervene between lawyers
and their clients; and (4) lawyers may improperly insulate themselves
from liability in malpractice claims.3 4
Advocates of limited liability responded with valid reasons for al-
lowing attorneys to benefit from a liability shield. These advocates
argued that denying access to limited liability created disincentives for
experimentation with new entity forms, created the potential for a
competitive disadavantage for attorneys, and created potential obsta-
cles to raising necessary capital.35 Limited liability advocates also con-
tended that attorney-owners may unnecessarily interfere with the work
of attorney-employees to the same extent corporate employers
would.36 The desire for favorable corporate tax treatment overcame
the controversy3 7 and law firms were permitted to form professional
corporations beginning in the early 1960s.38
31. Paas, supra note 4, at 372. See infra notes 38, 40 (discussing the tax treatment of
a PC).
32. See, e.g., Kalish, supra note 21, at 564.
33. See In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 557 (Fla. 1961); In re Bar Ass'n of Hawaii,
516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Haw. 1973); In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 263 A.2d 692, 696-97
(R.I. 1970). See generallyJ. F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Practice by Attorneys and Physicians as
Corporate Entities or Associations Under Professional Service Corporation Statutes, 4 A.L.R.3D
383 (1965 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the statutory authorization for attorneys and phy-
sicians to render professional services within PCs).
34. H. Bradley Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27 Fo~rHAm L. Rxv. 353, 354-55
(1958).
35. Kalish, supra note 21, at 572.
36. Id.
37. See Kalish, supra note 21, at 563-64; In re Bar Ass'n of Hawaii, 516 P.2d 1267,
1268 (Haw. 1973). Note, however, that courts understood that the professional's pri-
mary motivation in forming a PC was to obtain tax benefits. At least one court used that
understanding as a factor in denying limited liability protection to shareholders in a
dentists' professional corporation. See Vinall v. Hoffman, 651 P.2d 850, 851-52 (Ariz.
1982).
38. R. Craig Hannah, Legislative Note, Professional Corporations: Shareholder Liability
and the Saving Clause, 42 ARx. L. REv. 777, 777 (1989); Kalish, supra note 21, at 563;
Pas, supra note 4, at 372-73.
(Vol. 20
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The tax motivations were undermined by tax legislation in the early
1980s. This legislation essentially negated the tax advantages of the
professional corporation.3 9 Consequently, commentators argue that
PCs are now formed not for tax reasons, but because of other corpo-
rate nontax factors,40 such as limited liability.41 This possible shift in
motivation raises the issue of whether attorneys should continue to
benefit from the PC's liability shield.
C. Limits on Limiting Liability
Regardless of the entity's liability shield, traditional tort rules do not
permit an attorney (or any other individual) to escape personal liabil-
ity for personal misconduct. 42 However, an attorney can limit personal
liability arising from a fellow practitioner's tortious and contractual
misconduct by selecting an entity with a liability shield.43 Therefore,
when forming a law firm, an attorney's entity selection may be largely
influenced by that entity's ability to limit the vicarious liability of the
firm's individual members.
Irrespective of state statutory provisions, the extent to which the per-
sonal liability of an attorney can be limited is influenced by the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,44 the ABA Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, 45 and the appropriate state rules of profes-
sional conduct.46 These rules recognize that the "ultimate" power for
39. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981);
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(1982). This legislation reduced the tax advantages of professional corporations, espe-
cially those advantages concerning corporate qualified retirement plans, by equalizing
the differences between corporate and non-corporate taxation treatment. See also Ka-
lish, supra note 21, at 564 (discussing the change in tax treatment of the professional
corporation).
40. Corporate business entities are characterized by continuity of life, limited liabil-
ity, free transferability of ownership interests, and centralized management. Such at-
tributes arise because the corporation is a separate legal entity. CALlSON, supra note 23,
§ 2.05, at 2-9.
41. Hannah, supra note 38, at 777; Karen M. Maycheck, Shareholder Liability in Profes-
sional Legal Corporations: A Survey of the States, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 817, 817 (1986); Paas,
supra note 4, at 374.
42. REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 5, § 143.
43. See infra parts III. A, B. (discussing the liability shields of PC and LLC business
entities).
44. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8(h) (1983).
45. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY EC 6-6 (1980).
46. See, e.g., MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h)(1992).
States may also have rules concerning the admission and discipline of attorneys that
expressly prohibit the limitation of liability. See IND. ST. ADMis. AND Disc. Rule 27(c)
(1993) which states:
Incorporation by two (2) or more lawyers associated in the practice shall not
modify any law applicable to the relationship between the person or persons
furnishing professional services and the person receiving such service, includ-
ing, but not limited to, privileged communications which bind all associated,
1994]
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deciding attorney liability issues lies with the state supreme courts.4 7
Although the PC and LLC statutes provide a liability shield, the legal
profession's ethical requirements may mandate a higher standard of
responsibility.
Attorneys are permitted to engage in the practice of law within a
business entity offering limited liability48 provided that two ethical safe-
guards are followed: "1) the lawyer rendering the legal services to the
client must be personally responsible to the client; [and] 2) restrictions
on liability as to other lawyers in the organization must be made appar-
ent to the client .... "49
Additional ethical criteria concerning the limitation of attorneys' lia-
bility are articulated in tie Model Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, Ethical Canon 6-6, states that:
A lawyer should not seek, by contract or other means, to limit his
individual liability to his client for his malpractice. A lawyer who han-
dles the affairs of his client properly has no need to attempt to limit
his liability for his professional activities and one who does not han-
dle the affairs of his client properly should not be permitted to do so.
A lawyer who is a stockholder in or is associated with a professional
legal corporation may, however, limit his liability for malpractice of
his associates in the corporation, but only to the extent permitted by
law.50
Rule 5.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct suggests fur-
ther limits on the extent to which attorney liability can be reduced by
delineating the circumstances under which a partner or supervising
lawyer may be held liable for a fellow member's misconduct.51 While
the language of the Rule delineates specific instances in which an at-
as well as the liability of each for all, arising out of the professional services
offered by one (1) lawyer associated with others in the same corporation, as
existed in a partnership for the practice of law.
Id.
47. See, e.g., In re Daly, 284 Minn. 567, 571, 189 N.W.2d 176, 178-79 (1971) (stating
that the state supreme court has the ultimate authority over the regulation of the prac-
tice of law as well as the authority to formulate those rules and regulations under which
attorneys must practice).
48. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsiblity, Formal Op. 303 (1961)
(ability of lawyers to practice professional services as a PC).
49. Id.
50. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTy EC 6-6 (1980) (emphasis added).
An earlier draft of the Code of Professional Responsibility read as follows:
A lawyer should not seek to limit his liabililty to his client for malpractice,
whether by contract, limitation of corporate liability, or otherwise. Thus the
liability of lawyers who are stockholders in a professional legal corporation
should be the same as it would be if they were practicing as partners.
See AMERiCAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESsIONAL RFSPONSIBILrr 273
textual and historical notes (1979). This legislative history indicates the ABA's resist-
ance to permitting attorneys to benefit from the corporate limited liability shield.
51. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr 5.1 (b)-(c) (1983) which provides:
1150 [Vol. 20
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torney may be held vicariously liable as a disciplinary measure, the
Comment expands those instances within a criminal or civil setting by
stating that "[w] hether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally liable
for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of
these Rules."52
Notwithstanding ABA ethical standards and statutory attempts to
limit attorney liability, the ultimate power to determine the scope of an
attorney's personal liability lies with the courts.53 The court's general
decisionmaking power is supported by the decision in First Bank &
Trust Co. v. Zagoria.54 In that case, the Georgia Supreme Court stated
that:
[Ethical Consideration 6-6] authorizes a limitation of liability for the
malpractice of associates by contract or arrangement with the clients
of the professional corporation. However, it cannot successfully be
argued that Ethical Consideration 6-6 is a self-executing rule which
automatically insulates each shareholder of a professional corpora-
tion from liability for the malpractice of the other.55
The Georgia Supreme Court then proceeded to prohibit attorneys
from limiting their personal liability for another firm member's
misconduct.56
However, other state supreme courts have used this same power to
determine that a liability shield may be used by attorneys.57 In Rhode
Island Bar Ass'n,58 the Rhode Island Supreme Court granted limited
liability to attorney shareholders on the basis that the public interest
was not adversely affected by the decision.59 The court reasoned that
requiring the corporation to maintain mandatory liability insurance
(b) A lawyer having direct supervising authority over another lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the rules
of professional conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsibile for another lawyer's violation of the rules of
professional conduct if-
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer prac-
tices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of
the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated
but falls to take reasonable remedial action.
Id. This provision essentially qualifies each state's statutory limited liability shield lan-
guage in both the professional corporation and limited liability company statutes as
type III. See infra notes 69 and 87 and accompanying text.
52. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 5.1 cmt. 6 (1983).
53. Id.
54. 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983), on remand, 306 S.E.2d 433 (1983).
55. Id. at 676.
56. See infra part V. C. for analysis of the Zagoria decision.
57. See, e.g., In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 263 A.2d 692 (RI. 1970).
58. 263 A.2d 692 (R.I. 1970).
59. Id. at 697.
1994]
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would guarantee that the corporation's clients would not suffer as a
result of the limited liability.60
III. A COMPARATrVE ANALYSIS OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY SHIELDS OF
STATE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
LIMITED LIABILrIy COMPANIES6 1
A. The Liability Shield of the Professional Corporation
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted PC
60. Id. In effect, it can be argued that mandatory liability insurance provides a
source of recovery which substitutes for the assets of partners or shareholders who are
shielded from liability by the limited liability shield. See, e.g., Kalish, supra note 21, at
581.
61. In addition to the PC and the LLC, some states also allow professionals to form
registered limited liability partnerships (RLLP). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515
(1975) (amended 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3431-3433 (1991 & Supp. 1993); N.C.
GEN STAT. § 59-45 (1993); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art 6132b §§ 15, 45A-C (West 1970
& Supp. 1994). RLLPs are general partnerships in which partners may be shielded
from personal liability for negligent acts of other partners. Steven A. Waters & Matthew
D. Goetz, Partnerships, 45 Sw. LJ. 2011, 2022 (1992).
Unlike the liability shields of the PC and LLC, the RLLP shield only attempts to
limit a partner's vicarious liability for the tortious misconduct of other members of the
partnership. For example, the Texas RLLP statute states: "Except [for debts and
obligations of the partnership arising from errors, omissions, negligence,
incompetence, or malfeasance], all partners are liable jointly and severally for all debts
and obligations of the partnership...." TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b § 15(1)
(West Supp. 1994). The Texas RLLP liability shield does not limit a business owner's
vicarious liability for anything other than tortious acts committed by other business
members. The Louisiana, Delaware, and North Carolina RLLP statutes contain similar
liability shield language. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515(3) (1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3431 (C) (West Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45 (1993).
As additional RLLP statutes are proposed and- enacted, the possibility exists that
future RLLP statutes will provide a contractual liability shield similar to the PC and LLC
shields. For an example of a proposed statute that appears to provide a contractual, as
well as tortious, liability shield, see 1993 MA H.B. 3503 § 3(2) (SN) which states "[a]
partner in a registered limited liability partnership shall not be personally liable
(including, without limitation, liability for contribution) for debts and obligations of
such partnership which arise out of its performance of or failure to perform any services
while a registered limited liability partnership . . . ." However, based upon the
interpretations of the PC statutes, the extent to which the liability shield will be able to
limit vicarious liability of professional-shareholders for corporate debts is questionable.
RLLPs provide additional benefits to professionals who utilize this new entity. In
addition to limited liability, RLLPs are much easier to form because any business or
professional group operating as a general partnership can register as an RLLP simply by
filling out a form and paying a nominal per partner fee. Lisa Isom-Rodriguez, Limiting
the Perils of Partnership, AM. LAw., July-Aug. 1993, at 30.
Moreover, RLLPs also receive pass-through tax treatment similar to partnerships
and, therefore, do not impose the double tax penalty suffered by corporate business
entities. Id.
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statutes62 that contain limited liability shield provisions. 63 The liability
shield protects all professions included in the statute from vicarious
liability for the tortious and contractual misconduct of the corpora-
tion's other members. 64 The scope of these liability shields can be clas-
sified into four categories according to the statute's treatment of
shareholder liability:
Type I) the extreme approach: completely limited liability6 5 or com-
pletely unlimited liability;
66
Type II) professional corporation shareholder personal liability lim-
ited to personal acts and omissions;
67
62. See Prof. Corp. Handbook (CCH) 11 5001-111 (1974) (providing full text of
state laws).
63. See infra notes 65-69 listing each state's PC statute according to its limited liabil-
ity shield language.
64. In contrast, compare the intended scope of the language of the registered lim-
ited liability partnership statutes that generally only attempt to limit a partner's vicari-
ous liability for the tortious misconduct of another partner. See supra note 61.
65. Maycheck, supra note 41, at 819-20. IOWA CODE § 496C.9 (1993), N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 53-6-8 (Michie 1983) and R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-5.1-1 (1992) fit this category.
These three statutes contain a limited liability shield provision similar to Rhode Is-
land's, which reads as follows: "Except as in this chapter otherwise provided, all provi-
sions of the general corporation law, including the Rhode Island Business Corporation
Act, applicable to domestic business corporations shall be applicable to corporations
organized under this chapter." R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-5.1-1 (1992). The language of this
provision indicates that the liability protection afforded to professional corporation
members is the same as that provided under general business corporation law-limited
liability for both the tortious and contractual misconduct of other members. Maycheck,
supra note 41, at 819.
66. Maycheck, supra note 41, at 820-22. Currently, four states-Colorado, Oregon,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming-have a limited liability provision that provides for unlimited
liability. COLO. R. Civ. P. 265(A) (4) (1993); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 58.185 (1987); Wis.
STAT. § 180.1915 (1993); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 17-3-102 (1989). For example, Oregon's
statute provides:
(2) A shareholder of a professional corporation may be held: ... (c) Jointly
and severally liable with all of the other shareholders of the corporation for
the negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct committed by any shareholder,
or by a person under the direct supervision and control of any shareholder in
the rendering of professional services on behalf of the corporation to a person
receiving the service.
OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 58.185 (1987). These four states' statutory provisions are sub-
stantially similar. However, Colorado has an exception for PC's with adequate insur-
ance coverage (CoLo. R. CIrv. P. 265(A) (4) (1993)) and Wisconsin has an exception for
debts and contractual obligations of the PC (Wis. STAT. § 180.1915 (1993)).
67. Maycheck, supra note 41, at 822. The states with this category of statutory provi-
sion include the following: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 10-4-390 (1987); Alaska, ALAsKA
STAT. § 10.45.140 (1989); Hawaii, HAwAii REv. STAT. § 416-153 (repealed, effective July
1, 1987); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 274.055 (Michie 1989); Louisiana, LA. Rav.
STAT. ANN. § 12:807 (West 1969); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 708 (West 1981);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 319A.10 (1992); Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. § 89.060
(1991); North Dakota, N.D. CErr. CODE § 10-31-09 (Supp. 1993); South Carolina, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-51-70 (Law Co-op 1989); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 47-
1994]
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Type III) professional corporation shareholder liability limited to
personal misconduct or misconduct of any person under the share-
holder's direct supervision;68 and,
Type IV) the savings clause: professional corporation shareholder's
professional relationship retained between the person rendering the
service and the person receiving the service.69
13A-7 (1991); Texas, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528e(16) (West 1979 & Supp.
1994).
Alabama's statute, for example provides:
(a) Every individual who renders professional services as an employee of a
domestic or professional corporation shall be liable for any negligent or
wrongful act or omission in which he personally participates to the same ex-
tent as if he rendered such services as a sole practitioner.
(b) The personal liability of a shareholder, employee, director or officer of a
domestic professional corporation (other than a not-for-profit corporation)
shall be no greater in any respect than that of a shareholder, employee, direc-
tor or officer of a corporation organized under the Alabama Business Corpo-
ration Act.
ALA. CODE § 10-4-390(a)-(b) (1987).
68. Maycheck, supra note 41, at 826. A majority of states, seventeen, has this type of
statute. These states are Arizona, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-905 (Supp. 1993); Con-
neticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-182(e) (1993); Delaware, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 608
(1991); Florida, FLA. STAT. ch. 621.07 (1993); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 30-1306 (1979);
Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 415-8 (1991); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-15-2-6
(Bums Supp. 1993); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 450.226 (West 1989); Missis-
sippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-9-11 (1989); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-4-404
(1993); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2210 (1991); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 294-A:17 (II)(1987); NewJersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:17-8 (West 1968); New
York, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1505(a) (McKinney 1986); Pennsylvania, 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2913(b) (1967); Virginia, VA. CODE § 54.1-892 (Michie Supp. 1993); Wash-
ington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 18.100.070 (West 1988). The District of Columbia also
follows this approach. D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-611 (1991).
For example, New York's statute provides:
(a) Each shareholder, employee or agent of a professional service corpora-
tion shall be personally and fully liable and accountable for any negligent or
wrongful act or misconduct committed by him or by any person under his
direct supervision and control while rendering professional services on behalf
of such corporation.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1505(a) (McKinney 1986).
69. Maycheck, supra note 41, at 834. All states, except Alabama, Colorado, Indiana,
New York, and Rhode Island have some type of savings clause. Fourteen states' statutes
contain a savings clause as the only statutory liability shield provision. These states are:
Arkansas, Aim CODE ANN. § 4-32-308 (Michie Supp. 1993); California, CAL. CORPu. CODE
§ 13410 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 14-7-7 (1989); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2715 (Supp. 1993); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & Ass'NS
§ 5-120 (Supp. 1993); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156A, § 10 (West 1992);
Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 356.150 (Vernon 1990); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55B-9(1993); Ohio, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1785.04 (Page's 1992); Oklahoma, OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 812 (West 1986); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-3-407 (1988);
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-11-10 (1991); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 808
(1993); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 30-2-5a (1993).
An example of a savings clause is GA. CODE ANN. § 14-7-7 (1989), which provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall limit the authority and duty of any
regulating board to regulate the several professions including the right to es-
1154 (Vol. 20
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Case law involving the scope of protection provided by these liability
shields with regard to the legal profession may be classified into two
categories: (1) those where the court does not interpret the statutory
language of the liability shields,70 and (2) those cases in which the
court does interpret the statutory language of the limited liability
shield.7T
A review of these cases suggests that in order to benefit from the
liability shield for the tortious misconduct of a fellow attorney-share-
holder or employee of the PC, an attorney must not have personally
tablish and enforce standards of practice, and nothing contained in this chap-
ter shall change the law or existing standards applicable to the relationship
between the person furnishing a professional service and the person receiving
such service, including, but not by way of limitation, the rules of privileged
communication and the contract, tort, and other legal liabilities and profes-
sional relationships between such persons.
Id.
70. See, e.g., First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (Ga. 1983), on
remand, 306 S.E.2d 433 (1983) (holding an attorney-shareholder personally liable for
dishonored checks issued by another attorney-shareholder); In re Bar Ass'n of Hawaii,
516 P.2d 1267,1268 (Haw. 1973) (permitting legal PCs but requiring unlimited liability
of attorneys for the malpractice of their associates); South High Development, Ltd. v.
Weiner Lippe & Cromley Co., 445 N.E.2d 1106, 1107 (Ohio 1983) (imposing personal
liability on individual shareholders of a legal PC for the debts of the corporation);
Melby v. O'Melia, 286 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that a service
corporation is not the same as a regular business corporation and therefore a legal
service corporation may not be treated identical to a general business corporation).
In a recent California Court of Appeals decision, Beane v. Paulsen, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d
486 (Ct. App. 1993), attorney-shareholders in a legal PC were held jointly and severally
liable for another shareholder's legal malpractice because of a State Bar Law Corpora-
tion rule. This rule states:
For law corporations that apply to the State Bar for a Certificate of Registra-
tion on or after October 27, 1971, security for claims against it by its clients for
[malpractice] shall consist of an executed copy of [a written agreement... by
each of the shareholders, jointly and severally guaranteeing payment by the
corporation of all claims established against it by its clients for [malpractice]
arising out of the practice of law by the corporation ....
Id. at 490 (quoting State Bar Law Corp. Rules, rule IV B(3)).
State courts have also denied other professionals the ability to benefit from the
professional corporation limited liability shields. See, e.g., Boyd v. Badenhausen, 556
S.W.2d 896, 898 (Ky. 1977) (finding a physician personally liable for the negligence of
the PC's clerical staff); Nelson v. Patrick, 326 S.E.2d 45 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
radiologist-shareholder personally liable for negligence of fellow shareholder which oc-
curred during course of professional corporation's business).
71. See, e.g., We're Assoc. Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, 480 N.E.2d 357 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1985) (refusing to hold a professional corporation's shareholder personally liable
for ordinary business debts of the corporation because the professional corporation
statute required the rendition of professional services). See generally Grayson v. Jones,
710 P.2d 76, 77 (Nev. 1986) (finding that a shareholder of a professional corporation
was not personally liable for the tortious acts of another member because the share-
holder did not personally participate in the misconduct).
19941 1155
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participated in the acts72 or, more expansively, not have directly super-
vised and controlled the individual responsible for the misconduct. 73
On the face of the statutes, the "direct supervision and control" lan-
guage, compared with the "personally participated" language, broad-
ens the liability exposure of the PC attorney. However, even when the
"direct supervision and control" language is included with the "per-
sonal misconduct" language, an attorney-shareholder is unlikely to be
held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of a fellow member without
some personal fault on the part of the shareholder. 74
72. For example, in Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579, 581, cert. granted, 765 P.2d
1277 (Utah 1988), the court would not hold an attorney-shareholder vicariously liable
for the malpractice of the PC's other members unless the attorney-shareholder had
personally participated in the act or omission during the performance of the profes-
sional service. The factors the court used to determine that there was no personal
involvement in the misconduct included: 1) the shareholder never represented the
clients in any matter; 2) the shareholder never corresponded with either client regard-
ing a legal matter; 3) the shareholder never saw the clients' files and never discussed
the contents of the files with any other firm member; and 4) the shareholder was a
member of a PC. Id. at 580.
Examples of PC statutes using the "personal participation" language include both
types I and II. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
73. For example, the New York PC statute maintains personal liability for the per-
son who renders the professional services and also specifically provides that a share-
holder is liable for the misconduct of another individual under the shareholder's direct
supervision and control. N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAw § 1505(a) (McKinney 1986).
In Connell v. Hayden, 443 N.Y.S.2d 383, 402 (App. Div. 1981), involving a physi-
cians' professional service corporation, the court reversed a lower court's denial of sum-
mary judgment by reasoning that even though the physicians were shareholder-
employees, the plaintiff had to prove that each physician was at fault in order to hold
each one liable.
PC statutes using the "direct supervision and control" language are type III statutes.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Gershuny v. Martin McFall Messenger Anesthesiologists P.A., 539 So.
2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 1989) (holding that physician shareholders were not liable for a
nurse's negligence because the nurse acted "independently and not under the direct
supervision of a physician within the meaning of the statute"). In Conne/ 443 N.Y.S.2d
at 397, the court held that while a professional corporation itself is vicariously liable, as
is any corporation, for the acts of the corporation's employees, a supervisor is not liable
because he lacks the right to select, control, and discharge the employee
which is essential to the imposition of vicarious liability under [respondeat su-
perior]. This does not mean that a supervisor may not be liable for the injuries
caused by the conduct of one of his subordinates. It does mean that his liabil-
ity is not vicarious, that is, without fault on his part.
Id. at 397.
The Conner court further stated that fault includes intentionally directing an act,
directing or permitting conduct that the supervisor should realize creates an unreason-
able risk of harm, and failing to use reasonable care in taking control over the conduct
of another who the supervisor should realize is likely to cause injury. Id. at 398. See also
Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 (Utah 1988) (holding that a plaintiff must show that
the shareholder actually participated in the misconduct or omission to be held liable),
cert. granted, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988).
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Courts have also focused on interpreting the "professional services"
language of the liability shield to determine whether attorneys may use
the shield. Depending on a court's interpretation of this phrase, vica-
rious liability may be extended to ordinary business debts and obliga-
tions of the professional corporation.
75
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Herkert v. Stauber76 that "[i] n
order for the breach of contract entered into with a professional ser-
vice corporation to result in personal liability, it must be proved both
that the breach relates to 'professional services' and that the breach
was a negligent or wrongful act committed in the rendition of those
professional services."77 Other courts interpreting "professional serv-
ices" have reasoned that if business debts of the corporation are de-
fined as ancillary to the rendition of professional services, shareholders
of the professional corporation will be held vicariously liable for such
debts.78
75. See Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A., 207 S.E.2d 267 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974)
(suggesting that if the misconduct was part of the law firm's professional services, all
other shareholders of the firm could be held liable for one shareholder's misconduct),
rev'd on other grounds, 209 S.E.2d 795 (N.C. 1974). See also Nelson v. Patrick, 326 S.E.2d
45, 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (following Zimmerman, the court held an "innocent" share-
holder of a PC jointly and severally liable for another shareholder's medical malprac-
tice because the misconduct occurred during the course of ordinary business); Reiner
v. Kelley, 457 N.E.2d 946, 951 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (finding that attorney-shareholders
had a personal duty to guarantee the financial responsibility of the PC for breach of
duty). See genera/ly Annotation, What Constitutes Professional Services Within Meaning of
Statute Preserving Individual Liability of Professional Employees of Professional Corporation, As-
sociation, or Partnership, 31 A.L.R.4A 898 (1984 & Supp. 1993) (analyzing both state and
federal decisions that have expressly considered the question).
76. 317 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1982).
77. Id. at 836. See also Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d at 675 (stating in dicta that a PC liability
shield may limit an attorney-shareholder's liability for "obligations which do not arise as
a result of a breach of a lawyer's obligation to his client or an act of professional
malpractice").
78. See, e.g., Infosearch, Inc. v. Horowitz, 459 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Civ. Ct. 1982) (holding
that the shareholders were individually liable for business debts of the PC). In a subse-
quent decision, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the Infosearch decision and
found that a PC shareholder could not be held personally liable for ordinary business
debts because the PC statute required the rendition of professional services. We're
Assoc. Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, 480 N.E.2d 357, 359 (N.Y. 1985).
19941
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B. The Limited Liability Shield of the Limited Liability Company79
The enactment of the first LLC statute by Wyoming in 197780 and
the 1988 IRS revenue ruling8 1 qualifying Wyoming's LLC as a partner-
ship for tax purposes82 established the LLC as a viable business entity
alternative. Currently, forty-six states have enacted an LLC statute and
five other states have pending legislation.S3
Like the PC liability shield, the LLC liability shield attempts to limit
a professional's vicarious liability for the contractual and tortious mis-
conduct of the company's members. LLC statutory shield provisions
can be classified into four categories according to their treatment of
member/manager liability:
79. For an analysis of the LLC entity, see generally Thomas E. Geu, Understanding
the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part One), 37 S.D. L. REv. 44
(1992); Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging
Entity, 47 Bus. LAw. 375 (1992).
The limited liability company business structure closely resembles that of a
professional corporation. Similar to a PC, the LLC can be structured as a member-
managed LLC with the members possessing the authority to act on behalf of the
company or a manager-managed LLC with an elected or appointed official acting on
behalf of the company. Keatinge et al., supra note 79, at 390. In contrast to the
professional corporation, the limited liability company allows partnership "flow-
through" federal income tax treatment while also affording members the protection of
a "corporate-like" limited liability shield without the forfeiture of control and
management of the company. Geu, supra note 79, at 45.
80. Act of March 4, 1977, ch. 155, 1977 Wvo. SEss. LAws 512 (codified at Wvo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -143 (1989)).
81. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. Revenue Rulings permitting state LLCs to
receive partnership tax benefits have been issued in twelve states: Arizona (Rev. Rul.
93-93, 1993-42 I.R.B. 13); Colorado (Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-3 I.R.B. 8); Delaware (Rev.
Rul. 93-38, 1993-21 I.R.B. 4); Florida (Rev. Rul. 93-53, 1993-26 I.R.B. 7); Illinois (Rev.
Rul. 93-49, 1993-25 I.R.B. 11); Nevada (Rev. Rul. 93-30, 1993-16 I.R.B. 4); Oklahoma
(Rev. Rul. 93-92, 1993-42 I.R.B. 11); Rhode Island (Rev. Rul. 93-81, 1993-38 I.R.B. 7);
Utah (Rev. Rul. 93-91, 1993-41 I.R.B. 22); Virginia (Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-3 I.R.B. 6);
West Virginia (Rev. Rul. 93-50, 1993-25 I.RIB. 13).
The IRS has also released "more than 20 private letter rulings" concerning the tax
consequences of newly enacted LLC legislation. Carter G. Bishop & Daniel S.
Kleinberger, Structuring the Minnesota LLC BENCH & B. OF MINN., Nov. 1993, 21, 23.
82. Keatinge et al., supra note 79, at 383-84.
83. States with LLC statutes include Wyoming (1977); Florida (1982); Colorado
and Kansas (1990); Virginia, Utah, Texas, and Nevada (1991); Minnesota, Iowa,
Oklahoma, Maryland, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Rhode Island, and West
Virginia (1992); and, Alabama, Arkansas, Conneticut, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wisconsin (1993); Alaska, District
of Columbia, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennes-
see, and Washington (1994).
States with pending LLC legislation as of August 15, 1994 are California, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. Because of the recency of their enactment,
the LLC statutes of the District of Columbia, Ohio, South Carolina, and Washington are
not analyzed in this Comment.
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Category I) completely limited liability;8 4
Category II) LLC members/managers personal liability limited to
their own misconduct;
8 5
Category III) LLC members/managers personally liable for their
own misconduct as well as for the misconduct of others under their
direct supervision and control;8 6 and,
84. For example, Delaware's LLC liability shield states:
Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, the debts, obligations and liabili-
ties of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort or other-
wise, shall be solely the debts, obligations and liabilities of the limited liability
company; and no member or manager of a limited liability company shall be
obligated personally for any such debt, obligation or liability of the limited
liability company solely by reason of being a member or acting as a manager of
the limited liability company.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-303 (1993). A majority of state LLC statutes contain this
type of shield language. See ALAsKA STAT. § 10.50.275 (1994); COLO. Rxv. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-80-705 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-303 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.436 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7620 (Supp. 1993); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 12:1320 (West Supp. 1994); 1994 ME. LEGIS. SERV. ch. 718(A-1), § 645(1)
(West); MINN. STAT. § 322B.303 (1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.057 (Vernon Supp.
1994); 1994 Miss. Laws ch. 402, § 26(1); NEB. STAT. § 21-2612 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 86.371 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-23 (Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-29
(Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. § 53-19-13 (Michie Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18
§ 2022 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 63.165 (1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 47-34-17 (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-247-406 (1994); VA. CODE § 13.1-1019
(Michie 1993); Wis. STAT. § 183.0304(1) (1993); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-103(b)
(1989). This type of LLC liability shield statutory language closely parallels the type I
PC liability shield statutory language. See supra notes 65-66.
85. An example of this type of statute is the Indiana Business Flexibility Act, which
states:
A member, a manager, an agent, or an employee of a limited liability company
is not personally liable for the debts, obligations, or liabilities of the limited
liability company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, or for the
acts or omissions of any other member, manager, agent, or employee of the
limited liability company. A member, a manager, an agent, or an employee of
a limited liability company may be personally liable for the person's own acts
or omissions.
IND. CODE § 23-18-3-4(a) (1994). See also ALA. CODE § 10-12-45 (Supp. 1993); AR.
CODE ANN. § 4-32-308 (Michie Supp. 1993); IND. CODE § 23-18-3-4 (1994); 1994 Ky. Acts
ch. 275, § 30; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n § 11.05 (West 1994); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-2b-111 (2) (1994). This type of statute closely resembles the type II PC stat-
utes. See supra note 67.
86. Arizona's LLC liability shield language is characteristic of this type of statute.
The provision states:
The liability of a manager or employee of a limited liability company is several
only, and a member, manager or employee of a limited liability company is
not vicariously responsible for the liability of another member, manager or
employee unless such other member, manager or employee was acting under
his direct supervision and control while performing professional services on
behalf of the limited liability company.
Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-846 (Supp. 1993). See also IDAHO CODE § 53-615(3) (Supp.
1993); MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & Ass'NS § 4A-301.1 (Supp. 1993); MIcH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 450.4905 (West 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-1306 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 304-D:9 (Supp. 1993); 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 576, § 1303(a); N.C. GEN. STAT.
1994]
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Category IV) the savings clause: all rights and obligations within the
professional relationship are preserved.8 7
Two states, Oregon and Rhode Island, have expressly prohibited any
professional group from practicing as an LLC.88 However, the major-
ity of LLC statutes expressly permit professionals, including attorneys,
to practice as LLCs. This is accomplished by either defining "busi-
nesses" as "any occupation or profession,"89 providing for a separate
provision within the LLC statute,90 or through a separate professional
LLC statute. 9 1
Nevertheless, statutory approval alone does not guarantee attorney
LLCs the protection of the liability shield. Regardless of whether pro-
fessionals are statutorily permitted to form LLCs, attorneys may also
require approval from their respective regulatory body, generally the
American Bar Association or the state's highest court.92 This require-
ment is recognized in most statutes by the inclusion of language pro-
viding that, notwithstanding the provisions contained in the LLC
statute, each professional LLC is subject to the rules and regulations
§ 57C-2-01(c) (1993). Such LLC shield language is similar to the type III PC liability
shield language. See supra note 68.
87. Two states, Georgia and Iowa, have only a savings clause as their statutory lim-
ited liability shield provision. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-314 (Michie Supp. 1993); IOWA
CODE § 490A.1507 (1993).
88. OR. REV. STAT. § 173-19(2) (1993); RI. GEN. LAws § 7-16-3 (1992). The Geor-
gia legislature, following the state supreme court's denial of limited liability for a legal
professional corporation in First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983),
included a provision in the Georgia LLC statute that essentially excludes attorneys from
obtaining limited liability when practicing within a limited liability company. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-11-314 (Michie Supp. 1993). The statute states, in part: "This chapter
does not alter any law with respect to disregarding legal entities." Id.
89. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.402(6) (West Supp. 1994).
90. See, e.g., IowA CODE §§ 490A.1501-1519 (1993).
91. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-12-45 (Supp. 1993); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-843
(Supp. 1993); ARuc CODE ANN. § 4-32-306 (Michie Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.402(b) (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-201(b).(Michie Supp. 1993);
IDAHO CODE § 53-615(1) (1993); IND. CODE § 23-18-2-2(15) (1994); IOWA CODE
§ 490A.1502 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 450.4901(1) (West 1989); MINN. STAT.
§ 319A.03 (1992); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 359.702(4) (Vernon 1990); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 35-8-1301 to 1307 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2632 (Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 304-D:2 (Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-01 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 10-31-01 to 10-31-14 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2001 (West Supp.
1994); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (11.05) (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-
2b-104 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1101 (Michie 1993); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-
103(b) (1989).
92. Unlike attorneys, in a 1991 amendment to Rule 505, the "accountancy regula-
tory board" clearly authorized accountants to practice as an LLC business entity.
AICPA PROFSSIONAL STANDARDS ET § 505.01 (1993). More than 92% of the 126,149
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants voted to affirm the use of LLCs by
accountants. AICPA Press Release (Jan. 15, 1992). The legal profession has received
approval by the ABA to practice as a professional corporation (see supra note 48), but
the LLC has not yet been addressed by the ABA.
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mandated by that jurisdiction's board or boards regulating a specific
professional service.93
IV. THE LIMITED LIABILITY SHIELD OF THE MINNESOTA PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
A. The Limited Liability Shield of the Minnesota Professional Corporation
In 1973, the Minnesota Legislature enacted Minnesota Statutes
Chapter 319A which permits individuals engaged in rendering profes-
sional services to form PCs.94 Under Chapter 319A, "professional cor-
poration" is defined as "a corporation organized under [the PC
statute] for the purpose of rendering professional service."95 "Profes-
sional service" is defined to include the practice of law.96
Minnesota's PC liability shield provides that:
[The PC statute does] not alter any law applicable to the relationship
between a person furnishing professional service and a person receiv-
ing the professional service, including liability arising out of the pro-
fessional service and the confidential relationship and privilege of
communications between the person rendering professional service
and the person receiving the professional service; provided, however,
that no person is personally liable in tort for any act not personally
participated in. No director, officer, or employee of a professional
corporation or foreign professional corporation is personally liable
in contract for any contract executed on behalf of the corporation
within the limits of the executor's actual authority.9 7
The language of this liability shield can be categorized as a type 1198
statute, meaning that the shield limits a PC shareholder's personal lia-
bility to only those acts in which the shareholder personally
participates.99
93. See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-847(B) (Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1-
24 (Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE § 490A.1506 (1993); MIcH. COMp. LAws ANN.
§ 450.4905(2) (West 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-115 (1992). This provision may
impliedly recognize the inherent power of the state judiciary to regulate the practice of
law. Such language can be interpreted to mean that the regulatory board has the final
determination as to the rules and regulations placed upon the particular profession.
Consequently, because the regulation of the practice of law lies within the power of the
judiciary, legislatures may be recognizing the state supreme court's inherent power to
determine rules and regulations concerning the practice of the law.
94. MINN. STAT. § 319A.03 (1992).
95. MINN. STAT. § 319A.02, subd. 4 (1992).
96. MINN. STAT. § 319A.02, subd. 2 (1992).
97. MINN. STAT. § 319A.10 (1992).
98. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
99. See Maycheck, supra note 41, at 822.
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Like other states' PC liability shields,100 Minnesota's shield preserves
the professional relationship between the person rendering the service
and the person receiving the service by way of a savings clause.l01 Nev-
ertheless, the question remains whether the Minnesota PC liability
shield will protect attorney-shareholders from vicarious liability if
tested in Minnesota's courts.1 02
B. The Limited Liability Shield of the Minnesota Limited Liability
Company
Enacted January 1, 1993, the Minnesota LLC statute provides a new
business entity choice for Minnesota professionals.10S Through an ex-
press provision of the Minnesota PC statute, the state legislature has
authorized the use of the LLC entity by professionals, including
attorneys. 10 4
The liability shield language applying to those professionals choos-
ing an LLC provides that "a member, governor, manager, or other
agent of a limited liability company is not, merely on account of this
status, personally liable for the acts, debts, liabilities, or obligations of
the limited liability company."105 Consequently, as with other state
LLC liability shields,106 Minnesota's LLC shield purports to protect at-
torneys from vicarious liability for another LLC member's contractual
and tortious misconduct.107
100. Maycheck, supra note 41, at 834-35. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 415A-11 (1985 &
Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-31-09 (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-
13A (1991 & Supp. 1993).
101. MINN. STAT. § 319A.10 (1992).
102. See infra part VI. Analyzing whether Minnesota attorneys will be granted per-
sonal liability protection for the misconduct of the members of the firm by using the PC
or LLC business form.
103. MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.01-.955 (1992).
104. MINN. STAT. § 319A.03 (1992) (stating that "one or more natural professional
persons may organize a limited liability company pursuant to chapter 322B"). MINN.
STAT. § 319A.02, subd. 2 defines personal services to include legal services. Id.
105. MINN. STAT. § 322B.303, subd. 1 (1992).
106. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text for a comparative analysis of LLC
limited liability language in other states' statutes.
107. MINN. STAT. § 322B.303, subd. 1 (1992). Although expressly providing that an
LLC member will not be liable for the LLC's liabilities, the provision does not expressly
state that the member will not be liable for the misconduct of the LLC's other mem-
bers. However, the liability shield does seek to limit personal liability for the miscon-
duct of the other members. The LLC will be strictly liable for the misconduct of
individual members because of the master/servant relationship under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. See generally KEETON Er AL., supra note 5, at § 69. The LLC liability
language, therefore, prevents the individual members or managers from being held
strictly liable for misconduct in which the individual is not personally involved. Thus,
because the LLC liability shield language expressly states that individuals will not be
held liable for liabilities of the LLC, the shield provides a member or manager of an
LLC with protection from vicarious liability.
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The scope and applicability of the LLC liability shield to the legal
profession has not been judicially tested. Therefore, if and when the
shield is tested, Minnesota courts will be faced with an issue of first
impression. The courts will be required to determine the appropriate-
ness of upholding the statutory language and legislative intent to allow
attorneys to benefit from the protection of the liability shield.108
V. THE INHERENT PowERs DOCTRINE AND THE REGULATION OF THE
PRACTICE OF LAW BY THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
A. The Inherent Powers Doctrine
The inherent powers doctrine has been defined to encompass those
judicial powers "not expressly granted by [the] constitution but [which
are] said to arise from the very existence of the judiciary as an in-
dependent branch of government."109 The doctrine has been divided
into two theories: the affirmative inherent powers doctrine and the
negative inherent powers doctrine.11O
The affirmative inherent powers doctrine supports the power of the
courts to perform functions without legislative direction. 1' In con-
trast, the negative inherent powers doctrine seeks to grant the judiciary
the "exclusive" power over various issues in order to prevent further
action by the legislature.1 12
The negative inherent powers doctrine is based on the constitu-
tional separation of powers doctrine in which governmental power is
separated into three distinct branches,1 13 with each branch perform-
108. See infra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
109. Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciay to Regulate the Practice of Law-A Proposed
Delineation, 60 MIm. L. REv. 783, 784 (1976).
110. See generally J. CRATSLEY, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS (National Judicial
College ed., 1980) (discussing the inherent powers doctrine).
111. See, CHRuLS W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS §§ 2.2.2 -2.2.3 (1986).
112. Id. at 2.2.3.
113. The United States Constitution and all state constitutions vest the powers of
government in three separate and distinct branches. Note, supra note 109, at 786 n.14.
Thirty-six states expressly prohibit the separate branches from exercising another
branch's powers. R. DISHMAN, STATE CONSTrrurIONS: THE SHAPE OF THE DOCUMENT 6-7
(rev. ed. 1968). The Minnesota Constitution is similar to most other state constitutions:
"The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments: legislative,
executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these
departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others
except in the instances expressly provided in this constitution." MINN. CoNsT. art. III,
§ 1.
This separation of powers theory "has been modified in American practice by the
complementary theory of checks and balances, in which the powers of government are
blended, each branch exerting direct but limited control over the other two." Note,
supra note 109, at 786 (citing M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POW-
ERS 13 (1967)). The primary goal of the system is to "ensure against the undue concen-
tration of power in any single department." Note, supra note 109, at 786.
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ing specific governmental functions without interference from another
branch. Those courts that do not possess constitutional authorization
to undertake various rulemaking procedures have found such power
by combining the inherent powers doctrine with the separation of
powers doctrine to essentially conclude that the courts have rulemak-
ing powers exclusive of the legislative branch.114
There are three distinct areas in which the Minnesota Supreme
Court has exercised this inherent power: 1) procedural rule-mak-
ing,115 2) judicial administration rulemaking,116 and 3) practice
rulemaking.117 Cases addressing the issue of attorney-shareholder lim-
ited liability indicate that legislative enactment of statutes concerning
this issue falls within the court's inherent practice rulemaking
power. 118
114. See Note, supra note 109, at 786; 7 CJ.S. Attorney and Client § 6 n.94 (1980 &
Supp. 1993) (listing state courts, including Minnesota, that assert the inherent power to
regulate the practice of law). See, e.g., Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d
275 (1973) (recognizing the court's inherent power over the regulation of the practice
of law). Even when the legislature enacts a statute that infringes on one of the court's
inherent powers, the court may use the comity doctrine to uphold the legislation with-
out relinquishing its control over the particular rule-making power at issue. Note, supra
note 109, at 791-92.
The ABA House of Delegates has passed a resolution reasserting its support of the
exclusive province of the courts to regulate the legal profession. See McMillion, New
Legislative Priorities, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 129.
115. Procedural rulemaking has been defined as "the ability to decide and control
the procedural rules or laws under which the courts will operate." Maynard E. Pirsig &
Randall M. Tietjen, Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers in Minnesota, 15 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 141, 143 (1989) (discussing in detail the development and scope of
the procedural rulemaking power of the Minnesota Supreme Court). See, e.g., State v.
Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 194 (Minn. 1983) (granting the court the inherent power to
establish rules of evidence); Clerk of Court's Compensation v. Lyon County Comm'rs,
308 Minn. 172, 182, 241 N.W.2d 781, 787 (1976) (finding that a court order setting the
minimum salary of the clerk of the district court was not an appropriate use of the
judiciary's inherent power). See generally CHARLEs W. WoLFRAm, MODERN LEGAL ETmCS
§ 2.2.1, at 22 (1986).
116. Judicial administration rulemaking power is defined as concerning those rules
that govern "the court's internal administrative matters." Pirsig & Tietjen, supra note
115, at 143 n.5. See State v. Ogg, 310 Minn. 433, 438-39, 246 N.W.2d 560, 563-64
(1976) (setting forth the proper procedure for review of driver's license revocation
proceedings).
117. Practice rules govern the "conduct and practice of attorneys andjudges." Pirsig
& Tietjen, supra note 115, at 143 n.5; see also In re Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216
Minn. 195, 12 N.W.2d 515 (1943) (allowing the court to integrate Minnesota attorneys).
118. See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (Ga. 1983), on remand,
306 S.E.2d 433 (1983) (disregarding the express language of the PC statute in relying
on the court's inherent power over the practice of law and holding an attorney-share-
holder personally liable for dishonored checks issued by another attorney-shareholder);
see also In re Bar Ass'n of Hawaii, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Haw. 1973) (permitting legal PCs
but requiring unlimited liability for attorneys for the malpractice of their associates);
South High Dev., Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., 445 N.E.2d 1106, 1109 (Ohio
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that issues "directly relating
to and governing the conduct of the legal profession generally"119 are
within the court's jurisdiction and the court may use its inherent
power to create rules and regulations to further the primary function
of the courts.120 Furthermore, even though the legislature has the
power to enact legislation regulating the creation of a business entity,
the legislature's attempt to similarly regulate the practice of law is a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.121 The distinction be-
tween the two issues is based on a belief that there is a "fundamental
difference between any commercial business and a profession. .. and
that it is by professional rather than commercial standards that [the
professional's] conduct will be judged ... ."122
One commentator argues that the theory behind the judiciary's reg-
ulatory power over the practice of law stems from the fact that attor-
neys are "officers of the court whose activities are crucial to the court's
operation, [and] their qualifications and conduct must be subject to
the control of the court."' 23 Therefore, if the conduct the legislature
seeks to regulate is essential for the operation of the courts, the regula-
tion of such conduct is considered within the inherent power of the
judiciary124 and the legislature's action may be an unconstitutional vio-
lation of the separation of powers doctrine.
1983) (imposing personal liability on individual shareholders of a legal PC for the debts
of the corporation).
119. In re Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 200, 12 N.W.2d 515, 518
(1943) (holding that the supreme court has the authority to hear and rule upon any
matter that affects the conduct of the legal profession).
120. Id. (justifying the establishment of an integrated bar through the supreme
court's inherent power to regulate the practice of law).
121. Id.
122. In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 43, 266 N.W. 88, 91-92 (1936) (holding invalid a
statute attempting to establish a two-year statute of limitations for bringing disciplinary
proceedings against an attorney), modified by, 197 Minn. 35, 267 N.W. 142 (1936).
123. Note, supra note 109, at 785.
124. Id. at 786. However, even if considered an inherent power of the judiciary,
many commentators have struggled with the issue of whether the constitutional separa-
tion of powers theory mandates that such regulation be the sole jurisdiction of the
judicial branch. Id. at 786-87.
Commentators have argued that there may be a danger that exclusive judicial con-
trol of the legal profession could undermine public confidence in the court:
The inherent power doctrine is detrimental to the courts, as well as to the bar,
because it places a severe strain upon the standing of the courts with the pub-
lic. Generally, the courts are not subjected to the public criticism which is
incidental to controversial governmental matters, because the public under-
stands that the function of the courts is simply to administer the law as it is,
and that the courts have no direct responsibility for what the law is. This un-
derstanding of the nature of the judicial function is the foundation of the
public's respect for the courts.
Charles A. Beardsley, The Judicial Claim to Inherent Power over the Bar, 19 A.B.A. J. 509, 511
(1933). Other commentators have suggested a different delineation of power over the
regulation of the legal profession. See, Note, supra note 109, at 797.
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B. Minnesota's Use of the Inherent Powers Doctrine
Unlike a few state constitutions,125 the Minnesota Constitution does
not expressly reserve the right to regulate the practice of law to the
judiciary. Yet, the Minnesota Supreme Court invokes the inherent
powers doctrine to justify judicial decisions invalidating legislative acts
that promulgate rules and regulations regarding the legal profession.
The supreme court first applied the inherent powers doctrine in In
re Greathouse.126 The court disbarred a Minneapolis attorney who em-
ployed other attorneys to solicit business, a practice that was then not
uncommon nor prohibited by statute.12 7 Nevertheless, the court dis-
barred the attorney for "unethical conduct'128 without statutory au-
thority to do so.
Without express statutory authorization, the decision was based on
the court's inherent power to regulate the practice of law.129 The court
stated that "[t]hejudicial power of this court has its origin in the Con-
stitution, but when the court came into existence, it came with inher-
ent powers. Such power is the right to protect itself, to enable it to
administer justice whether any previous form of remedy has been
granted or not."13o The Greathouse decision is significant for providing
the foundation for the court's creation of various inherent powers of
the judicial branch.1Sl
125. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. V, § 1; PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
126. 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933).
127. Id. at 64, 248 N.W. at 739-40.
128. Id. at 53, 248 N.W. at 736-37.
129. The power to regulate the practice of law has been deemed to include the
power to regulate bona fide practitioners as well as the power to define law practice. See
generally Comment, Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judicial
Power, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 162, 166 (1960) ("defining the 'practice of law' leads to the
determination of the scope of an exclusive judicial power"); 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client
§ 29 (1980 & Supp. 1993) ("The power to regulate and define what constitutes the
practice of law is vested in the judicial, not the executive or legislative branch.").
130. In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. at 55, 284 N.W. at 737.
131. Note, supra note 109, at 790. Subsequent Minnesota court decisions expanded
the areas of judicial power when there was no "enabling" legislation. See, e.g., In re
Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N.W.2d 515 (1943) (authorizing the
court to make rules and regulations concerning the administrative structure of the
bar). The court in Integration of Bar of Minnesota stated:
The fundamental functions of the court are the administration ofjustice and
the protection of the rights guaranteed by the constitution. To effectively per-
form such functions, as well as its other ordinary duties, it is essential that the
court have the assistance and cooperation of an able, vigorous, and honorable
bar. It follows that the court has not only the power, but the responsibility as
well to make any reasonable orders, rules, or regulations which will aid in
bringing this about, and that the making of regulations and rules governing the legal
profession falls squarely within the judicial power thus exclusively reserved to the court.
Id. at 199, 12 N.W.2d at 518 (emphasis added). See also Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn.
582, 585-86, 254 N.W. 910, 911-12 (1934) (prohibiting a claims adjuster from practicing
law).
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The supreme court's first use of inherent power to regulate the prac-
tice of law in order to invalidate an existing legislative act occurred in
In re Tracy.13 2 In that case, the court invalidated a statute of limitations
governing disbarment proceedings.133 The court reasoned that the
legislative enactment unconstitutionally interfered with the court's
power to regulate the practice of law because the regulation placed
limitations on what the court could and could not hear as evidence in
a disbarment proceeding. 3 4
The court further explained the Tracy holding by indicating that not
all legislative attempts to regulate the practice of law would be found
unconstitutional. 3 5 The court would "comply with the legislative will
whenever [the court] can without ceasing to function as independent
judges"13 6 and provided that the laws "were found to be reasonable
and just in their application.., and.., were considered sound expres-
sions of public policy."' 3 7
Four years later, in Cowern v. Nelson,'3 8 the court appeared to accept
legislative enactments by choosing to "defer to the legislative regula-
tion as a declaration of public policy in harmony with the expression of
courts in general, and as a legislative effort to cooperate with and im-
plement the efforts of the courts in the enforcement of that policy."' 3 9
The court allowed real estate brokers to draft legal documents but re-
fused to accept a statutory exemption that permitted the brokers to
charge fees for drafting legal documents.140 In reaching this decision,
the court weighed the likelihood of public harm against the public
inconvenience that would arise if the statute was invalidated.14'
Shortly thereafter, in In re Integration of Bar of Minnesota,142 the court
approved the integration of the state bar. The court reasoned that its
primary functions were "the administration of justice and the protec-
tion of the rights guaranteed by the constitution."14 Moreoever, "to
effectively perform such functions it is essential that the court have...
the assistance and cooperation of an able, vigorous, and honorable
bar."'44 Therefore, "the court not only has the power, but the respon-
132. 197 Minn. 35, 266 N.W. 88 (1936), modified by 197 Minn. 35, 267 N.W. 142
(1936).
133. Id. at 46-47, 266 N.W. at 93.
134. 197 Minn. at 46-47, 266 N.W. at 93.
135. 197 Minn. at 46, 266 N.W. at 93.
136. Id.
137. 197 Minn. at 46, 266 N.W. at 93.
138. 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940).
139. Id. at 646, 290 N.W. at 797.
140. Id. at 647, 290 N.W. at 797.
141. Id.
142. 216 Minn. 195, 12 N.W.2d 515 (1943).
143. Id. at 199, 12 N.W.2d at 518.
144. Id.
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sibility as well, to make any reasonable orders, rules or regulations
which will aid in bringing this about .. .. "145
In Sharood v. Hatfield,146 the court held unconstitutional a statute
that attempted to revise the manner in which all occupations licensed
by the state, including the legal profession, were regulated.147 The
court stated that the legislature lacked the power to regulate the prac-
tice of law.148 While recognizing a general willingness to comply with
the intent of the legislative branch when attempting to regulate the
"administrative procedures for admission and discipline of attor-
neys,"149 such compliance would only occur if the statute "did not
usurp the right of the court to make the final decision."'150
However, the court failed to state how the statute at issue impaired
the judiciary's final review power. Consequently, the court seemed to
ignore the spirit of cooperation with the legislative branch:15 1
We have no doubt but what some of the provisions of [the statute] as
they apply to the judiciary were well motivated, and upon adequate
consideration it is entirely possible that the court may wish to adopt
some of the provisions by rule of the court. However, in so doing, we
do not concede that their enactment was a permissible legislative
prerogative.1 5 2
The Sharood decision "not only holds that the legislature may not val-
idly regulate the legal profession, but it also appears to negate the pos-
sibility of legislative influence in the matter."'15
Finally, in Mack v. City of Minneapolis,154 the supreme court held that
an act of the state legislature was not an unconstitutional violation of
the separation of powers doctrine. 5 5 The legislative enactment at is-
145. Id. The court further argued that the integration of the bar "would raise the
standards of the profession; eliminate the unfit, the dishonest, and the unethical; ...
and afford protection and recourse to those who might otherwise by reason of destitute
circumstances be unable to protect their legal or constitutional rights" resulting in a
furthering of the court's function of administering justice. Id. at 200-01, 12 N.W.2d at
518.
146. 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973).
147. Id. at 429, 210 N.W.2d at 282.
148. Id. at 425, 210 N.W.2d at 280. The court stated that "[w]hile this court desires
to work in harmony with the legislative and executive branches of government, we can-
not and should not abdicate our judicial responsibility by failing to assert our inherent
right to perform a function which is clearly judicial...." Id.
149. Id. at 424, 210 N.W.2d at 279.
150. 296 Minn. at 424, 210 N.W.2d at 279. See supra notes 120, 123, 127, 133, and
139 for Minnesota Supreme Court cases in which the court struck down legislative acts
by arguing that the legislature went "beyond merely indicating what it deems desirable."
Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 424, 210 N.W.2d 275, 279 (1973).
151. Note, supra note 109, at 795.
152. 296 Minn. at 424-25, 210 N.W.2d at 280.
153. Note, supra note 109, at 795.
154. 333 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1983).
155. Id. at 752.
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sue imposed limits on, and allowed an administrative agency to set,
attorney fees in workers compensation cases.156 The court stated that
"[e]very legislative enactment 'comes to the court with a presumption
in favor of its constitutionality [and the] burden of proof is on the chal-
lenging parties to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the act violates
some particular constitutional provision.' "157
The court reasoned that a decision upholding the constitutionality
of the legislative act would not relinquish to the legislature or adminis-
trative agency the court's inherent right to regulate the practice of law.
The court stated that the "final authority over attorney fees is not given
to a nonjudicial body, since ultimately [the supreme court] can review
all attorney fee decisions." 158
Commentators have expressed dissatisfaction with the current status
ofjudicial power and have proposed alternative applications of the in-
herent powers doctrine. 159 One argument maintains that "[1] egislative
power over the practice of law should.., stem from the legislature's
general interest in serving the public, while judicial power [should]
stem from the need to assure that attorneys effectively aid the courts in
deciding cases." 160 Such a theory arguably recognizes that both the
judiciary and legislature have a legitimate interest in regulating the
practice of law and thus have separate constitutional powers to regu-
late attorneys.161
However, this interpretation would prohibit the judiciary from inval-
idating legislative acts not explicitly dealing with the practice of law
that unnecessarily hamper the role of the judiciary.162 The supreme
court's express denial of legislative power to regulate the practice of
law in Sharood v. Hatield6S makes it unlikely that the Minnesota
Supreme Court intends to adopt this proposed theory. 164
156. Id. at 747.
157. Id. at 751 (quoting Federal Distillers, Inc. v. State, 304 Minn. 28, 39, 229
N.W.2d 144, 154 (1975)).
158. Mack, 333 N.W.2d at 752. Additionally, the court referred to the "uniform prac-
tice throughout the country of assigning responsibility for attorney fees to compensa-
tion commissions" as further support for the acceptance of the statutory provision. Id.
at 753.
159. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Note, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role
of the Inherent Powers Doctrine 12 U. Apy. LrrriE RocK LJ. 1, 14 (1989-90) (suggesting
that the doctrine should only be invoked where legislation "cuts to the very core of
essential judicial functions").
160. Note, supra note 109, at 797.
161. Id. at 799.
162. Id. at 802-03.
163. 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973).
164. Note, supra note 109, at 804.
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C. Other State Courts' Use of the Inherent Powers Doctrine
In addition to statutory interpretation and board or court approval,
some courts have used the judiciary's inherent power to regulate the
practice of law as a means to deny attorneys any limitation of personal
liability for the misconduct of a firm's other members.
For example, the Georgia Supreme Court held a PC attorney-share-
holder personally liable for another attorney-shareholder's misconduct
in issuing dishonored checks to a client even though the liable share-
holder was not personally involved in the transaction.1 65 The court
stated that "when a lawyer holds himself out as a member of a law firm
the lawyer will be liable not only for his own professional misdeeds but
also for those of the other members of his firm."166
The Zagoria court refused to interpret the PC shield language, bas-
ing its decision on the "court's authority to regulate the practice of
law."167 The court would not "allow a corporate veil to hang from the
cornices of professional corporations which engage in the law prac-
tice."168 The court believed that a professional service organization is
discernibly different from any other commercial enterprise, because a
profession requires "adherence to the public interest as the foremost
obligation of the practitioner." 169
The Georgia Supreme Court's decision established the use of the
inherent powers doctrine to deny attorney-professionals access to lim-
ited liability.' 70 However, the question remains whether the Minne-
sota Supreme Court will use the same power to achieve the same result
in Minnesota.
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Interpretation of the Statutory Language
If the Minnesota Supreme Court chooses to recognize the legisla-
ture's implied regulation of the practice of law and merely interprets
the liability shield language, the applicability of the shield does not
165. First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Ga. 1983), on remand,
306 S.E.2d 433 (1983).
166. 302 S.E.2d at 676. The court further stated that "no distinction [could be
made] between partnerships and professional corporations." Id.
167. Id. at 675.
168. Id. at 676.
169. Id. at 675.
170. See, e.g., South High Dev., Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., 445 N.E.2d
1106, 1107 (Ohio 1983) (holding that an attorney-shareholder is personally liable for
PC debts on grounds that supreme court had inherent power to promulgate rules regu-
lating legal practice and pursuant to that power attorneys conducting business in PC
form were required to be personally liable for all PC debts as provided in supreme
court rules of practice).
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appear to be a debatable issue. 171 First, the PC has been a viable busi-
ness entity choice for Minnesota attorneys since 1973. Second, the
ABA has approved the use of PCs by the legal profession172 provided
an attorney remains personally responsible to the client and restric-
tions on the liability of fellow attorneys is made apparent to the cli-
ent.' 73 Third, Minnesota courts have not challenged the PC liability
shield since its enactment in 1973. Because the LLC liability shield
provides the same protection as the PC shield, one would expect the
same judicial deference.
Furthermore, an examination of the statutory language reveals ex-
pressed legislative intent that attorneys may utilize these business struc-
tures.174 The language of the PC and LLC liability shields presents no
ambiguities regarding who and what acts will be afforded liability pro-
tection.175 The obvious legislative intent of these statutes is to allow
attorneys to take advantage of all the aspects of each business entity,
including limited liability. Based on statutory interpretation, there is a
high probability that Minnesota courts would permit attorneys to limit
their exposure to vicarious liability.
B. The Effect of the Inherent Powers Doctrine on Limited Liability for
Minnesota Attorneys
On the basis of statutory interpretation, Minnesota attorneys should
be encouraged to use the PC and LLC to reduce vicarious liability ex-
posure. If unambiguous legislative drafting and an unchallenged legal
history were sufficient to uphold a statutory provision, every attorney
practicing within any PC or LLC would be provided some form of vica-
rious liability protection. In practice, however, this is not the case.
State courts reviewing liability shield provisions similar to Minne-
sota's shields have found grounds for holding attorneys jointly and sev-
erally liable for the misconduct of a firm's other members regardless of
the statutory language.' 76 Courts disallowing attorney liability limita-
171. See supra part I1, IV.
172. See supra note 48.
173. See supra text accompanying note 49. This Comment assumes that attorneys
practicing within the PC or LLC have not attempted to limit their personal liability for
their professional services, a violation of the MODEL CODE OF PROrssIoNAL RESPONSIBIL-
rry EC 6-6 (1980).
174. MINN. STAT. § 319A.04 (1992) provides that a professional may organize a PC
"for the purpose of rendering one specific kind of professional service." Id. A profes-
sional service is defined to include the "personal service rendered by a professional
pursuant to a license or certificate issued by the state of Minnesota to practice... law."
MINN. STAT. § 319A.02 (1992). A professional may organize an LLC to operate for the
same purposes. MINN. STAT. § 319A.03 (1992).
175. See supra part IV.
176. See, e.g., In reBar Ass'n of Hawaii, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268-69 (Haw. 1973); Boyd v.
Badenhausen, 556 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Ky. 1977).
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tions have essentially disregarded the statutory language by basing
their decision on the state judiciary's established and inherent power
to regulate the practice of the law.17 7
Similarly, Minnesota has invalidated legislative acts that attempt to
regulate the practice of law.178 Consequently, the supreme court has
firmly established the inherent power of the Minnesota state judiciary
to regulate the practice of law without interference by the state legisla-
ture.1 79 One must then determine whether the supreme court will ex-
ercise this power to invalidate the legislative regulation of the practice
of law arising out of the enactment of the PC and LLC liability shields.
With respect to the PC shield, disallowing attorney limited liability
may not contravene the legislature's original intent in enacting the PC
statute.' 8 0 The statute was primarily enacted to provide professionals
with the same tax benefits as business persons who chose to incorpo-
rate, 81 not to provide professionals with limited liability protection.182
In addition, a profession is distinguishable from any other commercial
business and is held to a higher standard of conduct;183 thus limiting
liability exposure does not serve to maintain this higher standard, but
rather results in professionals being held to the same standard of con-
duct as nonprofessionals.
By invalidating the liability shield with respect to the legal profession
only, the court can avoid infringing on the legislative function of regu-
177. See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (Ga. 1983), on remand,
306 S.E.2d 433 (1983) (stating that the legislature "has the clear right to enact technical
rules for the creation and operation of professional corporations, but it cannot consti-
tutionally cross the gulf separating the branches of government by imposing regulations
upon the practice of law"); In re Bar Ass'n of Hawaii, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Haw. 1973)
(asserting the court's inherent power to regulate the practice of law by allowing attor-
neys to practice as a professional corporation but disallowing attorney limited liability).
178. See, e.g., Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 429, 210 N.W.2d 275, 282 (1973)
(holding that provision of statute authorizing transfer of attorney registration fees to
general fund was unconstitutional); In re Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn.
195, 199, 12 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943) (finding court has power to make regulations and
rules governing the legal profession); Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 647, 290 N.W.
795, 797 (1940) (modifying legislative act that expressly allowed brokers to charge fees
for drafting legal documents); In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 44, 266 N.W. 88, 92 (1936)
(finding a statute which limited time within which proceedings for removal of attorney
can be commenced to be unconsitutional as a projection of legislative power into judi-
cial department), modified by 197 Minn. 35, 267 N.W. 142 (1936).
179. See supra part V. B.
180. See generally Stephen B. Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations
and Corporations, 49 MINN. L. REv. 603, 603-05 (1965) (discussing the history of the tax
concerns stemming from the professional corporation and association).
181. Id. at 603-05.
182. Id. at 687.
183. See, e.g., In reTracy, 197 Minn. 35, 43, 266 N.W. 88, 91-92 (1936), modified by 197
Minn. 35, 267 N.W. 142 (1936).
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lating state business entities' activities.184 The legal PC will continue to
have the advantage of business and tax benefits, while the court re-
mains in exclusive control of the practice of law.18 5 Thus, an invalida-
tion of the PC shield for the legal profession would not contravene
traditional judicial and legislative functions.
If the supreme court chooses to invaldiate the PC liability shield for
attorneys, it follows that Minnesota attorneys would not be afforded
the protection of the LLC liability shield.186 Having established inher-
ent power over liability issues concerning Minnesota attorneys, the
court could exert the same power within the confines of the LLC stat-
ute and still permit the legislature to define the other business charac-
teristics available to the entity.
However, if the court chooses to invalidate the LLC liability shield
for attorneys, the legislative intent of the statute would also be invali-
dated. A primary motivating factor for creating the LLC entity is to
provide individuals with limited liability.18 7 Judicial abrogation of that
intent merits serious consideration in light of the growing national ac-
ceptance accorded this entity.1ss
Nevertheless, the supreme court has shown a willingness to contra-
vene legislative intent to maintain regulatory power over the legal pro-
fession.189 Such actions promote the judicial function of guaranteeing
the administration of justice through the creation of an "able, vigor-
ous, and honorable bar."190 The court achieves this goal by promul-
gating rules and regulations that (1) heighten the standards of the
legal profession, (2) eliminate the unfit, dishonest, and unethical, and
(3) ensure remedies for injured parties.191 To that end, allowing attor-
neys to benefit from liability shields does not ensure that remedies re-
main available to parties injured by an attorney's actions.
184. See generally Ellen E. Sward, Resolving Conflicts Between Bankruptcy Law and the
State Police Power, Wis. L. REv. 403, 418-19 (1987) (providing examples of state market
regulations adopted by means of a state's police power).
185. See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (Ga. 1983), on remand,
306 S.E.2d 433 (1983) (setting forth a similar justification for the refusal of attorney
limited liability).
186. The Georgia Legislature has included language respecting the judiciary's
power to regulate the practice of law in the Georgia LLC statute. See supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
187. See Kalstrom, A New Way of Doing Business, WM. MrrCHELL MAGAZINE, Summer
1992, at 9, 9.
188. See Bishop & Kleinberger, supra note 81, at 23.
189. See, e.g., Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 647, 290 N.W. 795, 797 (1940) (mod-
ifying legislative act that expressly allowed brokers to charge fees for drafting legal
documents).
190. In re Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 199, 12 N.W.2d 515, 518
(Minn. 1943).
191. Id. at 200-01, 12 N.W.2d at 518.
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The supreme court may also find that limited liability legislation is
an infringement on the judicial branch's powers because the statutes
force the court to relinquish the right of final review of attorney liabil-
ity.192 This right has been reserved by means of the Model Code,
Model Rules, and the inherent powers doctrine.19 3 Judicial validation
of the PC and LLC statutes would essentially terminate the court's final
review power because the statutory provisions expressly disallow judi-
cial consideration of certain liability.194 The court is likely to hold that
this denial of review power is an invalid attempt to regulate the prac-
tice of law.
Finally, there is another viewpoint the supreme court may adopt by
choosing to uphold the liability shields despite their effect on the prac-
tice of law. This viewpoint is illustrated in the Mack'95 case, in which
the court supported a decision to uphold a legislative act regulating
attorneys' fees in workers compensation cases. The court based that
decision on the uniform practice of other jurisdictions that allows leg-
islatures to assign responsibility for establishing attorneys' fees to com-
pensation commissions. 196
The supreme court could possibly follow the uniform practice of
many other states that include vicarious liability shields within their PC
and LLC statutes.197 However, the court is more likely to look to the
uniform practice of those state courts that have tested the issue and
have declined to allow attorneys the use of such shields. 19 8 These deci-
sions may prove sufficiently persuasive in their analysis to provide Min-
nesota courts with grounds to invalidate the shields with respect to the
legal profession.
Regardless of the reasoning, the ultimate decision is likely to be one
that maintains the Minnesota Supreme Court's control over the regula-
tion of the legal profession. The trend of other state court decisions
using the inherent powers doctrine to regulate the practice of law indi-
cates a desire and willingness of the courts to preserve the judicial
192. See, e.g., Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744, 752 (Minn. 1983); Sha-
rood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 422-28, 210 N.W.2d 275, 279-81 (1973).
193. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
194. The language of the LLC liability shield precludes from personal liability for
another's acts any individual shareholder who does not personally participate in the
misconduct. MINN. STAT. § 319A.10 (1992); MINN. STAT. § 322B.303, subd. 1 (1992).
Thus, the enactment of these statutory provisions essentially removed the final review
power of the courts concerning individual member vicarious liability. However, the
court could always review the constitutionality of the statutory provisions.
195. Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1983).
196. Id. at 753 (reasoning that even if the legislative act was upheld, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reserved the power of final review over attorneys' fees decisions).
197. See supra notes 65-69 and 85-89 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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branch's essentially exclusive and final control over the practice of
law. 199
The final review power of the court implies that attorney limited lia-
bility is a permanently debatable issue. Regardless of whether the Min-
nesota Supreme Court validates or invalidates attorney liability shields,
the court can use changing public policy concerns or fact-specific cases
to alter prior determinations on this issue.200 Thus, attorney-share-
holders or attorney-members/managers are in the precarious position
of attempting to predict whether they will be protected from personal
liability for the misconduct of the firm's other members, or whether,
because of their occupation, they will forever remain potentially vicari-
ously liable for another's misconduct.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Comment addresses the problems Minnesota attorneys may en-
counter in attempting to absolve themselves from vicarious liability for
the misconduct of their firm's other members by utilizing the limited
liability shield contained in the Minnesota Professional Corporations
Actoi and the recently enacted Minnesota Limited Liability Company
Act.20 2 The express statutory language of these Acts purports to pro-
vide attorneys the protection of the limited liability shield contained in
the statutes.
However, because of the Minnesota Supreme Court's established
view concerning thejudiciary's inherent power to regulate the practice
of law without legislative interference,2 03 the court may invalidate the
statutes' attempts to govern the scope of liability afforded to the legal
profession if the issue is presented to the court. Other state courts
have been willing to deny attorneys access to similar shields on these
grounds.
On the other hand, the court may allow attorneys to benefit from
the limited liability shields, yet reserve the power to hold an attorney
vicariously liable pursuant to the court's final review power. Under
such an approach, attorneys would remain in essentially the same posi-
tion they were in before the limited liability shield provisions were
tested: an attorney-shareholder may or may not be held personally 1ia-
199. See supra part V. C.
200. See, e.g., State ex tL Chase v. Babcock, 175 Minn. 103, 107, 220 N.W. 408, 410
(1928). The Minnesota Supreme Court argued that in interpreting an article of the
constitution, the court should construe the article "in the light of the social, economic,
and political situation of the people at the time of its adoption, as well as subsequent
changes in such conditions." Id. (emphasis added). See also Rice v. Connolly, 488 N.W.2d
241, 247 (Minn. 1992) (reiterating the viability of the Chase rule of construction).
201. MINN. STAT. §§ 319A.01-.22 (1992).
202. MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.01-.955 (Supp. 1993).
203. See supra part V. B.
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ble for a fellow member's misconduct regardless of whether the attor-
ney-shareholder uses the PC or LLC business entity that provides a
limited liability shield.
Because of this perpetual state of flux, Minnesota attorneys should
hesitate to assume that as a shareholder of a PC or member or man-
ager of an LLC they will be shielded from vicarious liability for the
misconduct of other members of their firm.
Debra L. Thill
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